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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
exist," 3) to the difference between the required notice and formal plead-
ings necessary in later stages of the suit,12 and 4) to the necessity of only
substantial compliance with the statute.'8 There are some jurisdictions,
however, which adopt a stricter construction, such as that previously fol-
lowed in Missouri.14
The broad interpretation now given to those provisions of the Missouri
notice statute requiring a statement in the notice of "the character and cir-
cumstances of the injury" is in accord with modern pleading tendencies to
remove "pitfalls in the way of honest claimants." 15  E. M. F.
Towrs-Re8 Ipsa Loquitur- EXPLODING OR BURSTING CONTAINERS-
[Kentucky].-The action in the instant case was brought against a brewing
company for injuries caused by the explosion of a beer keg which was at-
tached to a carbon dioxide gas tank. The question of the brewing com-
pany's liability was submitted under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on
the theory that the explosion of the keg was caused by the pressure of
fermentation of the beer contained therein. Held; reversing the lower court,
that negligence was not a reasonable deduction from the circumstances, and
therefore the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable.,
In order to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must
establish (1) that the accident was of a kind which, in the absence of
proof of some external cause, does not ordinarily happen without negli-
gence; (2) that the defendant owned, operated, maintained, or was respon-
sible for the management of the instrument doing the damage; and (3)
that the defendant possessed superior knowledge or means of information
as to the cause of the injury.2 One of the controversial problems which has
11. Dalton v. City of Salem, 136 Mass. 278 (1884); Sheehy v. City of
New York, supra, note 10; Savannah v. Helmken, 158 S. E. 64 (Ga. App.,
1931); Langley v. Augusta, 118 Ga. 590, 45 S. E. 486, 98 Am. St. Rep.
133 (1903) ; Titus v. City of Montesano, 106 Wash. 608, 181 Pac. 43 (1919).
12. City of Atlanta v. Hawkins, 42 Ga. App. 847, 166 S. E. 262 (1932) ;
City of Birmingham v. Guy, 222 Ala. 373, 132 So. 887 (1931); Judd v.
City of New Britain, 81 Conn. 300, 70 Atl. 1028 (1908); Lowe'v. Clinton,
133 Mass. 526 (1882); Spellman v. Chicopee, 131 Mass. 443 (1881); Maggs
v. City of Seattle, 86 Wash. 427, 150 Pac. 612 (1915); Sizer v. Waterbury,
113 Conn. 145, 154 Atl. 639 (1931); Brown v. City of Owosso, 126 Mich.
91, 85 N. W. 256 (1901).
13. Sheehy v. City of New York, 160 N. Y. 139, 54 N. E. 749 (1899);
City of Atlanta v. Hawkins, 42 Ga. App. 847, 166 S. E. 262 (1932); City
of Birmingham v. Guy, 222 Ala. 373, 132 So. 887 (1931); Judd v. City of
New Britain, 81 Conn. 300, 70 Atl. 1028 (1908); Savannah v. Helmken, 158
S. E. 64 (Ga. App., 1931).
14. Hilson v. City of Memphis, 142 Tenn. 620, 221 S. W. 851 (1920);
Spear v. City of Westbrook, 104 Me. 496, 72 Atl. 311, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.)
804 (1908) ; Mears v. City of Spokane, 22 Wash. 323, 66 Pac. 1127 (1900).
15. Snickles v. City of St. Joseph, 139 Mo. App. 187, 122 S. W. 122
(1909).
1. Fehr Brewing Co. v. Corley, 96 S. W. (2d) 860 (Ky., 1936).
2. 5 Wigmore, On Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2509, 1. c. 498; 3 Cooley,
Torts (4th ed. 1932) sec. 480, 1. c. 369.
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arisen in applying these prerequisites to an existing 'res ipsa loquitur case
is in determining whether the doctrine is applicable where the container
of a product explodes, breaks, or bursts.8
The weight of authority is to the effect that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is not applicable to the breaking, bursting, or exploding of a con-
tainer in which a commodity ordinarily harmless is sold.4 The basis is that
such an occurrence is one which may ordinarily happen in the absence of
negligence, and that the real cause, therefore, is entirely conjectural or
speculative.5 If a number of similar burstings or explosions have occurred,
however, these courts have held that the existence of negligence is reason-
ably deductible from the circumstances.6 In those cases where the contents
of the container are inherently dangerous, the rule of res ipsa loquitur is
generally regarded as proper. 7
The minority view is that the explosion or breaking of a container justi-
fies the jury in drawing an inference of negligence, provided that there has
been an affirmative showing that all persons through whose hands the object
passed after leaving the manufacturer were free from fault and that the
condition of the container and its contents was unchanged.8
3. Note, 4 A. L. R. 1094 (1919); Note, 8 A. L. R. 500 (1920); Note, 39
A. L. R. 1006.
4. Note, 4 A. L. R. 1094 (1919); Loebig's Guardian v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co., 259 Ky. 124, 81 S. W. (2d) 910 (1935) (explosion of Coca-Cola
bottle) ; Bates v. Batey & Co., 3 K. B. 351 (1913) (bursting of a bottle of
ginger beer); Dail v. Taylor, 151 N. C. 284, 66 S. E. 135 (1909) (bursting
of soda bottle).
5. Burnham v. Lincoln, 225 Mass. 408, 410, 114 N. E. 715 (1917) (a
five gallon carboy broke); The court in Loebig's Guardian v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124, 126, 81 S. W. (2d) 910 (1935), as regards the
inapplicability of the doctrine to the facts of the case said: "The doctrine
of r'es ipsa loquitur assumes, at least p'ima facie, the existence of negli-
gence from the mere occurrence and injury. Since the principle applies
only to cases where the existence of negligence is a more reasonable deduc-
tion from the circumstances, it should not be allowed to prevail where, on
proof of the occurrence, without more, the matter still rests in conjecture
alone."
6. In Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 119, 282 S. W.
778 (1926), where 27 Coca-Cola bottles were shown to have exploded, the
court held the condition "was such as to render them imminently, if not in-
trinsically, dangerous." See Dail v. Taylor, 151 N. C. 284, 288, 66 S. E.
135 (1909).
7. Weisen v. Halzman, 33 Wash. 87, 73 Pac. 797 (1903), where the court
proceeded upon the theory that the bottled champaign cider was a danger-
ous explosive; Torgensen v. Schultz, 192 N. Y. 156, 84 N. E. 956 (1908)
(explosion of siphon bottle of aerated water); Stone v. Texas Co., 180
N. C. 546, 105 S. E. 425 (1920) (where gasoline exploded) ; Selby v. Osage
Torpedo Co., 241 Pac. 130 (Okl. 1925) (explosion of nitroglycerine con-
tainer).
8. Stotle v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 307 Mo. 520, 271 S. W. 497, 39 A. L. R.
100 (1920) (explosion of bottle of beer) ; Riecke v. Anheuser-Busch Brew-
ing Asso., 206 Mo. App. 246, 227 S. W. 631 (1921) (explosion of bottle of
bevo) ; Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Donnevan, 25 Ga. App. 43, 102 S. E. 542(1920) (explosion of bottle of Coca-Cola); In Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss3/26
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This latter view does not seem to advance a sound solution to the prob-
lem.9 There are many types of containers upon the market, 0 and to allow
each person who professes to have been injured when one explodes or bursts
to reply upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, is to open the door to many
fictitious suits which are hard to disprove." In the absence of some direct
evidence of negligence by the defendant, 12 or of any showing that the con-
tents were reasonably calculated to react in this manner,"3 the jury could
at most speculate on the true causation.14 The instant case which refuses
to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur on a bare showing that the keg
exploded, seems to be in accord with the majority of the courts, as well as
with practical considerations of public policy.
M. J. G.
Bottling Works, 10 Ga. App. 762, 763, 73 S. E. 1087 (1912) the court said:
"The occurrence was unusual. Bottles filled with harmless and refreshing
beverage do not ordinarily explode. When they do, an inference of negli-
gence somewhere and in somebody will arise."
9. Supra, note 4 and cases cited.
10. Such as containers of milk, soda, beer, various medicinal products,
etc.
11. As the court said in Dail v. Taylor, 151 N. C. 284, 289, 66 N. E. 135
(1909): "it would be entirely unsafe to permit the application of the prin-
ciple contended for, or to hold that the explosion of a single bottle of such
an article under such circumstances should of itself rise to the dignity of
legal evidence sufficient, without more, to carry a case to the jury"; supra,
note 4.
12. In Coylyar v. Little Rock Bottling Works, 114 Ark. 140, 140, 169
S. W. 811 (1914), the plaintiff's proof showed that the bottle was im-
properly charged, and the issue of negligence was submitted to the jury.
13. Supra, note 7.
14. Supra, notes 4 and 5.
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